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1. The Lutheran Paul vs. the New Perspective 
 
In his recent study Perspectives Old and New on Paul: The 'Lutheran' Paul and His Critics, 
Stephen Westerholm surveys a topic that is, as he puts it, 'warmly debated in the saunas of 
Finland'.
1
 Since the topic in question concerns the apostle Paul's teaching of law, grace and 
justification, it is debated elsewhere as well. Continuing and rewriting his earlier work, 
Israel's Law and the Church's Faith
2
, Westerholm outlines an extensive research history 
which in the last decades has oscillated between two basic views. There is (1) the 'Lutheran' 
Paul who teaches that human beings are sinners, but justified by faith in Jesus Christ, not by 
the works they do. According to this classical view of justification, the law does not 
contribute to salvation but crushes human self-righteousness and drives human beings to seek 
mercy from God. Even as justified the Christians remain sinners who fail to do good with 
their own will. Thus we all continue to ponder the existential problems of Paul expressed in 
Rom. 7.14-25.
3
 
   In conscious opposition to this received view, many 20th-century biblical scholars have 
outlined (2) a 'new perspective', according to which Paul teaches that Christians can in fact 
live according to the Spirit. This new interpretation of Paul further holds that the struggle 
with law and sin essentially belongs to the pre-Christian existence of humans. According to 
the new perspective, Paul's conscience was not burdened by his own sins, but the Christian 
Paul is only critical of the shortcomings and wrong judgments of non-Christians, in particular 
the Jews.
4
 
   The new perspective emerged when the biblical scholars realized, or assumed to have 
realized, that they have read Paul through the lenses of Augustine and Martin Luther. In these 
two later Western theologians, however, we are confronted with a notion of introspective 
conscience that is not found in Paul. Whereas Augustine and Luther display an introspective 
awareness of sin and individual guilt, Paul in fact possesses a robust conscience and does not 
practise self-analysis. Already as a Jew Paul thought that he could lead a rather blameless life, 
and as a Christian he expected to be able to live his life according to the Spirit.
5
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   When Paul, from his particularly Christian perspective, criticizes the Jewish and Gentile 
ways of life, he is therefore not reporting his own personal and existential problems, but 
rather makes a theological point. A Christian can see that salvation does not come from the 
works of the law. However, it is only the viewpoint reached 'in Christ' that reveals the basic 
problem of our former striving after perfection. And since the Christian can achieve and has 
achieved the spiritual fulfilment, he or she does not need to be worried of the existential 
problem of failing to do good. In sum, both Jew and Christian may have a robust conscience 
and both in fact believe that they can do good works. The Christian knows that Jews and 
pagans are wrong in believing this, but the Christian also thinks that in the Spirit he is no 
longer under sin's power and can thus fulfill the law.
6
 
   A prominent argument in favor of the new perspective concerns the interpretation of the 
word 'I' in Romans 7. The 'Lutheran' view of Paul has interpreted this word to refer to Paul's 
own inner struggles with the law. Given this, one is almost compelled to understand 
justification as a theocentric event in which humans remain 'justified and sinners at the same 
time'. Humans cannot do the works of the law; they can only believe in God's promise in 
Jesus Christ. Paul's self-description in Romans 7 thus becomes a paradigmatic description of 
that individual introspection which is presupposed in the Lutheran doctrine of justification.
7
 
    Exegetes of the 20th century, in particular W.G. Kümmel and Krister Stendahl, have 
argued, however, that the 'I' to which Paul refers does not represent his own personal 
experience. It is rather a rhetorical or an exemplary I which is employed in order to 
demonstrate a general state of affairs. Paul uses an exemplary I in several places, e.g. in Rom. 
3.7, 1 Cor. 6.12, 15, 13.1 and Gal. 2.18, but in Romans 7 this is not self-evident. Without 
going into the exegetical discussion in detail, it may be said that the presupposition of an 
exemplary I helps us to understand why the law is criticized but not abrogated by Paul in 
Romans 6-8.
8
 
   According to the 'new perspective' it is neither the general Christian experience nor Paul's 
personal experience that is portrayed in Rom. 7.14-25. Instead, Paul here describes the 
general condition of humanity under the law. The exemplary I refers to a human condition 
which is not particulary Christian nor particularly Jewish, but shows the general relationship 
between sin and the law. In doing this the passage 'demonstrates the utter moral impotence of 
humanity under the law, a gloomy contrast to the glorious picture of redemption in Romans 6 
and 8'.
9
  
    Why is this new perspective on Romans 7 antagonistic to the 'Lutheran' Paul? Not 
because of this demonstration, but since Paul's own situation as a Christian is no longer 
represented under the universal human condition of sinfulness. For those who are in Christ 
Jesus, this condition is no longer valid (Rom 8.1). Christians, including Paul himself, are 
rescued from 'this body of death' by Jesus Christ (Rom. 7.24-25). Thus the exemplary I of 
Rom. 7.14-25 describes the pre-Christian situation of human sinner. The justified Christian is 
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no longer subject to this condition. And this is contrary to Lutheranism which teaches that our 
struggle with sin, lack of good will and life under the cross continue throughout Christian 
existence. 
   We may also note that the exemplary I does not depict a Jewish dilemma, but a universal 
human dilemma which, however, only appears as such a dilemma when it is looked at from 
the specific viewpoint provided by Christianity. In a somewhat paradoxical manner, the new 
perspective thus presents the situation described in Rom. 7.14-25 as a universal human 
dilemma which nevertheless only appears as such, once the human being has been set free of 
this dilemma by Jesus Christ and the Spirit of life (Rom. 8.2).
10
 
   This argument was outlined by Kümmel and Stendahl already many decades ago, but it 
gained new support in E.P. Sanders's work Paul and Palestinian Judaism.
11
 Sanders showed 
that the Jews of Paul's time did not boast of human achievement but believed in the grace of 
God which was in keeping with the observance of the law. Luther's contrast between 
righteousness of works and justification by faith and grace alone does not meet the historical 
situation of Paul since, for the first-century Judaism, 'salvation is always by the grace of 
God'.
12
 On the other hand, Paul according to Sanders observed a 'work-ethic' himself: already 
as a Jew he believed to be leading a rather blameless life, and as a Christian he was set free in 
the effort to do good because, as mentioned above, the Spirit enables Christians to do what 
the law requires.
13
  
   So, although the human condition, expressed in Romans 7, in a way remains a universal 
dilemma, it is relativized in three different ways: 1. the dilemma is not relevant with regard to 
Judaism in particular, 2. Christians have actually surpassed this dilemma because the Spirit 
enables them to fulfill the law, and 3. the whole dilemma only appears to be a universal 
dilemma from the specifically Christian viewpoint.  
   All three points seem to go radically against Luther and Lutheranism, since in Lutheran 
theology (i) the insufficiency of the law in overcoming sin has been seen as the problem of a 
Jewish righteousness of works, (ii) Christians are justified but they nevertheless remain 
sinners at the same time and thus remain faced with the dilemmas of Romans 7, and (iii) the 
experience of the Pauline 'I' in Romans 7 is seen as a universal problem: all humans wonder 
why 'I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate' (Rom. 7.15). 
    Continuing Westerholm's argument, we may note that the allegedly Lutheran reading of 
Rom. 7.15-20 contains still another problem. The exegetes have questioned the subject of this 
doing, but also the doing itself remains far from clear. What does the speaker not do? 
According to the 'Lutheran' interpretation, the justified Christian, or Paul himself, continues 
to sin. But does the speaker (A.) do always and everything wrong, and contrary to his will? It 
would be very odd to think that the paradigmatic Christian Paul, apostle and saint, would 
always do everything wrong and contrary to his will. There must be some qualifications in 
this non-willed doing. But how are we to read these qualifications into the text? 
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    The 'new perspective' seems to offer an elegant solution, since the Christian speaker only 
refers to the doings of the exemplary I (B.) in some earlier period, during which the extent of 
wrongdoing may have varied and need not bother the present speaker. A third logical 
possibility would be that the speaker is, as Rom. 7.14 explicitly says, the old and carnal 
person who is describing (C.) his current powerlessness. But this possibility must face the 
contradiction that, on the one hand, the speaker claims to understand his carnal situation 
while, on the other, he claims not to understand (Rom. 7.15) his own action. Assuming that 
there is a temporal difference between the present speaker and the exemplary I of the past, 
such contradictions can be solved. 
   Is the traditional Lutheran position thus declared to be exegetically invalid? No, since the 
exegetical case is not yet closed. In his extensive survey Westerholm actually believes that the 
new perspective of Sanders, Stendahl and others has not solved all the problems. He consoles 
Lutherans by saying that they have nevertheless 'rightly captured Paul's rationale and basic 
point'
14
, namely that salvation is by faith and through grace in Jesus Christ.  
   In fact, Westerholm himself moderately argues in favor of the 'Lutheran' Paul. According 
to Westerholm, many slogans of the 'new perspective' are exaggerations which need to be 
tested and qualified. He is critical of Sanders's results, because the Jewish harmony of 
obedience to the law, on the one hand, and trust in the gratuity of God's covenantal election, 
on the other, finally differs from the understanding of grace in Lutheran and Protestant 
Christianity. In its interplay of grace and works, first-century Judaism, as portrayed by 
Sanders, in fact resembles Pelagianism as refuted by Augustine and Martin Luther.
15
  In spite 
of these qualifications, it is nevertheless clear that the new perspective has presented powerful 
and plausible alternatives to the traditional Lutheran reading of Pauline theology of 
justification and the law. Therefore Westerholm attempts to take seriously both the 'old' and 
the 'new' perspectives. 
   In the following, my interest will not be exegetical. I will highlight some points which are 
relevant for our understanding of Luther and Lutheranism. For exegetes like Westerholm, 
Stendahl, Sanders and many others, the problem has been that the earlier New Testament 
scholars have read the texts through the lenses of Martin Luther and Lutheranism. Given this 
point of departure, they aim at liberating exegesis from the myopia caused by maladjusted 
lenses. They have not considered, however, what kind of Lutheranism has caused this 
myopia.  
   Is Martin Luther really saying all that the exegetical paradigm of the 'Lutheran Paul' has 
said? Or can it be that both Luther and Paul have been distorted or at least rigidly 
systematized by some later interpreters? Could it be that also in Luther studies we have, since 
the times of W.G. Kümmel, developed new perspectives? Could one even discover a more 
'Pauline' Luther with the help of contemporary historical, theological and also exegetical 
insights? Such questions will be the focus of my attention.
16
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      Although my interest is similar to Timothy George, 'Modernizing Luther, Domesticating 
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2. Participation in Christ: Biblical Scholarship, Ecumenism and Luther Studies 
 
    Before turning to Luther, some general comments on the recent history of New Testament 
scholarship, ecumenical theology and Luther studies ought to be made. 
    Participation in Christ in Pauline theology. Stephen Westerholm's presentation of 
'Lutheran Paul' vs. the 'new perspective' is related to another and broader exegetical issue 
dealing with the relative importance of the doctrine of justification in Paul's theology. It is 
clear that justification is important for Paul, but many biblical scholars have claimed that it 
need not be seen as the most important and central doctrine or as a concept which would be 
operative as the overall criterion of all other theological themes in Paul. 
   Already Albert Schweitzer paid attention to the theme of 'being in Christ' as an extremely 
important issue of Pauline theology. In the 20th-century exegetics, this view of the 'new life 
in Christ' or 'participation in Christ' has not seldom been regarded as a topic which is more 
important for the apostle than the doctrine of justification. One way to make this argument is 
to say that Paul's language of justification is prominent in Romans and Galatians because of 
the particular disputes and circumstances relevant for those letters. But in many other letters 
justification is not treated, whereas the language of participation in Christ and being in Christ 
is prominent everywhere in the Pauline letters irrespective of the particular disputes at hand.
17
  
    Moreover, many exegetes claim that even in Romans and Galatians the problems of 
justification are in fact solved with the theology of 'being in Christ' and participation. Without 
entering this exegetical argument in detail, it can be said that the 'being in Christ' can be 
regarded as the actual center and argumentative foundation of Paul's soteriology, whereas 
justification remains a more circumstantial topic, mostly relevant for Paul's disputes with 
Judaism.
18
  
     Generally speaking, many advocates of the above-mentioned 'new perspective' with 
regard to the law often also adopt the priority of participatory language in their interpretations 
of Pauline soteriology. This preference often strengthens their criticism of the 'Lutheran' Paul 
who was, in their opinion, forged to teach forensic justification by faith. Given this, the best 
exegetical option left to the 'Lutheran' Paulinists, for instance Ernst Käsemann and his 
students, was to broaden the idea of justification to include various aspects of sanctification, 
liberation and life in Christ. While this option is helpful for systematic theologians and has 
received some support in the exegetical study of Paul, it can be criticized by both strict 
Lutherans and the advocates of the 'new perspective' for making the language of justification 
unclear.
19
 
    One may nevertheless mention in passing that some exegetes have meanwhile learned to 
see Luther's view of justification not only as imputation but also and perhaps primarily in 
terms of 'Christ present in faith'. Mark A. Seifrid notes that Luther highlights this Pauline idea 
in his Commentary on Galatians, but does not speak of the imputation of Christ's 
righteousness. Seifrid remarks that the more narrowly forensic language stems from 
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Melanchthon and comes 'into widespread usage only after the Osiandrian controversy 
(1551)'.
20
 
      Ecumenism.  In their ecumenical agreements, contemporary Lutherans normally defend 
a view of justification that is both forensic and effective. In so doing they follow the 
above-mentioned exegetical option of broadening the language of justification in order to 
embrace the Pauline view of 'being in Christ'. Another strategic reason for doing this is that 
the ecumenical partners may not regard the forensic justification by faith as the highest 
criterion of true Christianity. But all churches speak of 'being in Christ' in the Pauline sense 
and connect this language with other aspects of Pauline soteriology, thus offering points of 
ecumenical convergence.
21
 
    According to the ecumenical strategy of many recent Lutheran agreements, justification is 
not merely a matter of God's favor or 'counting', but the divine favour is accompanied by a 
sacramental grace which effects and transforms the life or even the very person of the 
justified Christian. While the Christian,  to a certain extent, remains a sinner, he or she is 
nevertheless 'in Christ' and thus participates in the new creation. This effective grace may be 
called sanctification or life in the Spirit, but is often understood as an aspect of justification. 
Justification thus does not only comprise juridical relationships, but it also endows the 
believer with the gift of sacramental and christocentric reality. 
    A typical example of this strategy is the British-Nordic Porvoo agreement between 
Lutherans and Anglicans. Although the Anglicans participated in the European Reformation, 
they did not adopt the forensic justification or the distinction between law and gospel in a 
strictly Lutheran manner. In order to meet broader Anglican soteriology in a manner 
compatible with Lutheranism, the Porvoo agreement formulates this as follows: 'Both our 
traditions affirm that justification leads and must lead to 'good works'; authentic faith issues 
in love. We receive the Holy Spirit who renews our hearts and equips us for and calls us to 
good works. As justification and sanctification are aspects of the same divine act, so also 
living faith and love are inseparable in the believer'.
22
 This description comes rather close to 
those adherents of the 'new perspective' who teach that Christians have the Spirit and are able 
to do some good. 
    'Being in Christ' in Luther Studies. If one were to judge the state of Luther studies on the 
basis of Westerholm's exegetical research history, one could but wonder how one-sided it has 
remained. But it is very clear that modern interpreters of Luther have paid a lot of attention to 
the non-forensic and Christ-centered language in the Reformers' writings. In part this may 
have been a reaction to the challenge set by the exegetes since the days of Albert Schweitzer, 
but a more obvious reason has been that the language of participation and 'being in Christ' is 
as prominent in Luther as it is in Paul. 
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    As I have shown in detail elsewhere,
23
 the prominence of this language was observed 
already by Albrecht Ritschl and Wilhelm Herrmann, but it became a major issue for many 
scholars of the German Luther Renaissance, for instance Karl Holl, Erich Vogelsang, 
Reinhold Seeberg and Erich Seeberg. Also dialectic theologians like Karl Barth and Ernst 
Wolf wrestled with the fact that Luther so often speaks of the presence of Christ in faith. A 
variety of different interpretations emerged in order to show that this seemingly mystical and 
ontological language in Luther was in fact meant to be eschatological, moral/forensic or 
existential. Later scholars like Gerhard Ebeling, Marc Lienhardt, Albrecht Peters and Otto 
Hermann Pesch have built on this research trend.
24
 Contemporary Lutheran dogmatics of 
Wolfhart Pannenberg and Robert Jenson interpret Luther's view of justification in more 
ontological terms as 'presence of Christ in faith'.
25
 
     In the present paper I am not, however, concerned with these interpretations as such. 
What needs to be pointed out is only that the 'Pauline Luther' of the 20th-century Luther 
scholars has been found to speak in the manner of Paul. Moreover, this observation has 
challenged a one-sided forensic interpretation of justification by faith. As a result of this 
history, the effective-sacramental description of justification as gift and as participation in 
Christ has been widely discussed in academic Luther research. Throughout the 20th century, 
Luther research has emphasized that Luther characterizes salvation in terms of 'fides Christi' 
or as 'presence of Christ in faith'. 
     This effective or 'union with Christ' view of justification has been outlined, defended and 
further developed by contemporary Finnish Luther research, begun by  Tuomo Mannermaa's 
book Der im Glauben gegenwärtige Christus (1989).
26
 This Finnish school has not followed 
exegetical developments, but it has proceeded from the Scandinavian variety of Lutheranism, 
emphasizing the sacramental dimension of Christian faith and lacking the various 
antagonisms with Catholicism, characteristic of German Protestant theology. Although the 
new Finnish school is critical of the theological underpinnings of older German research, it 
also continues that research tradition of the German Luther Renaissance which has given 
more weight to the Pauline idea of communion with Christ. 
   Thus, the last one hundred years of Luther scholarship display a clear parallel between the 
exegetical discovery of the 'participation in Christ' language in Paul and the historical 
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rediscovery of  'fides Christi' or 'presence of Christ in faith' paradigm in Luther. Because of 
this parallel it may further be said that  Lutheran ecumenical theology has with good 
conscience adopted this broader understanding of justification and/or soteriology. I do not 
think that this needs to be debated much further since, in order to criticize successfully 
Lutheran ecumenism, one should also criticize the results of Luther studies and exegetical 
scholarship as well. In this sense the 'broader' understanding of justification, although perhaps 
not a very elegant construct within a strictly historical Pauline exegesis, serves well in 
ecumenism and systematic theology. 
    What remains a challenge for Lutheranism, however, are the issues which Stephen 
Westerholm has investigated in such great detail. These issues concern our permanent 
sinfulness and they can be expressed in terms of the three contradictions defined above: (1/i) 
whether Paul's proclamation of the insufficiency of the law is particularly meant to be a 
radical alternative to Jewish self-righteousness, (2/ii) whether Christians remain permanently 
unable to fulfill the law, and (3/iii) whether the 'I' of Romans 7 expresses both Paul's own 
permanent struggle and a universal problem of non-Christians and Christians alike. A positive 
answer to all these questions would imply that Luther does not embrace the new perspective 
with respect to the theology of law and sinfulness. But a negative answer to any of these 
questions would at least mean that Luther is more complicated on these issues than the 
exegetes have assumed him to be. It may also mean that subsequent Lutherans have misread 
Luther to an extent. 
 
3. The Pauline Luther: Counter-evidence to Westerholm's Luther 
 
Stephen Westerholm provides a concise summary of his understanding of Luther. This 
summary represents the exegetes' theological assumptions in an exemplary manner. The 
summary consists of six theses: 
1. In our relationship with God, faith in God's goodness rather than the good works we do is 
decisive. 
2. The law, like a mighty hammer, is meant to crush human self-righteousness and to drive 
human beings, made aware of their sinfulness, to seek mercy from the Savior.  
3. We are justified by faith in Jesus Christ, not by the works we do. 
4. Though believers are righteous in God's eyes, they remain sinners throughout their earthly 
lives. 
5. The law must be banished from the thinking of believers when their relationship with God 
is the issue. Yet it must continue its role of identifying and judging their sin.  
6. God predestined believers to salvation.
27
  
    We will keep this summary in mind when we proceed to the three alleged contradictions 
between Luther and contemporary exegetes. I am not attempting to make a new study of 
Luther, but will only briefly present results of some new studies and complement them with a 
few quotes from the German Reformer. My argument will be that, in many respects, Luther is 
closer to the 'new perspective' than has been assumed. 
 
3.1. How Radically Different is the Christian Alternative to the Mosaic Law? 
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    Our first contradiction (1/i) is closely related to the fifth thesis of Westerholm. Since the 
role of the law is a vast topic both in Luther's own writings and in the secondary literature,
28
 I 
will restrict my discussion on some general features which I consider to be representative, 
though not sufficient to outline Luther's whole theology of the law. Since I will focus on the 
law, I will not speak much of the Christian's 'being in Christ'. It should be kept in mind, 
however, that I presuppose the importance of this language for Luther's theology of 
justification and the law. 
     Although Luther emphasizes the freedom of the Christian, he remains critical of the 
so-called antinomism. While the Antinomians downplay the significance of the Decalogue for 
Christians, Luther stresses in contradiction to this that 'the law will not be abolished in all 
eternity; rather, it will remain - with the condemned as one to be fulfilled, with the blessed as 
fulfilled one'.
29
 Luther also keeps the Ten Commandments as the starting-point of his 
Catechisms.  In his Von den Konziliis und Kirchen Luther says that moral quality is an 
'external', that is, uncertain, mark of the church, and a total lack of moral quality and good 
works clearly signalises that something is lacking.
30
 Even though the church cannot be 
defined in terms of morals, Luther thus does not consider moral quality to be indifferent in the 
church. 
     In Luther's extensive collection of sermons on Matthew 5-7 (1530/32), the Sermon on 
the Mount is normally treated as an ethic of Christian individuals.
31
 Luther thinks that Jesus 
here clarifies and purifies the original will of God. However, the same will is basically 
expressed in the Decalogue.
32
 The ethics of Jesus is thus neither an abrogation of the Jewish 
law nor a higher and different ethic. It is rather a cleansing of the Decalogue, a law to be 
followed in the Christian community.
33
 Recent studies have emphasized the unity of the law 
in Luther's theology
34
, and I think that this unity is also maintained in Luther's interpretation 
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      See e.g. H.G. Geyer, 'Luthers Auslegung der Bergpredigt', in Geyer (ed.) Wenn nicht jetzt, 
wann dann? Festschrift für H.J. Kraus, Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchner Verlag 1984, 283-293. 
32
 
      See e.g.WA 32, 299, 15-19. 
33
 
      Luther says often that Jesus in Matthew 5-7 cleanses the Decalogue, or the original will of 
God, from later confusing interpretations, e.g. WA 32, 362, 30-363, 25. 
34
 
      See in particular Antti Raunio, 'Natural Law and Faith: The Forgotten Foundations of  
Ethics in Luther's Theology', in Union with Christ, 96-124. 
of Matthew 5-7 as an ethic for Christians. Although the law does not justify, it thus remains 
relevant for the believers in their relationship with God. 
    Luther's exposition of Matthew 5-7 has often been viewed critically since the Reformer 
writes against enthusiasts who want to rule the world with the Sermon on the Mount. The 
doctrine of two kingdoms means for Luther that the world must be ruled according to the civil 
use of the law, whereas the Sermon on the Mount is meant for individual Christians in order 
to describe the fruits of their faith.
35
 Thus, although Matthew 5-7 is not a higher ethic of 
perfection, it is neither a civil law. Interestingly, the Sermon on the Mount remains a 
Christian ethic. 
     Although one may criticize Luther for making Matthew 5-7 a merely interior and 
individualistic law, one is, for the same reason, also compelled to say that the Sermon on the 
Mount remains a description of the Christian individual's moral practise. As a Christian 
practise it cannot be 'banished from the thoughts'
36
 when the believer's relationship to God is 
at stake. On the contrary, the point of Christian ethics is found in the interior sense attached to 
moral action rather than in the external action. And this inner sense is related to the believer's 
relationship to God.
37
 Given this, one may ask whether Luther's view in fact comes closer to 
the 'new perspective' of Pauline exegesis, according to which the apostle observes a work 
ethic while believing that salvation is by grace. 
    Although these observations show that Luther was not indifferent to Christian behaviour, 
Lutheran theology has often left a gap between faith and works, or between law and grace. 
Many new studies proceed, however, from a more integrative vision.   Antti Raunio outlines 
Luther's view of Christian neighbourly love, expressed by the so-called Golden Rule (Matt. 
7.12) as an antagonistic alternative to the medieval view of 'order of love' (ordo caritatis). 
While the medieval view presupposes a human being who evaluates the objects of the 
universe and then loves them according to this evaluation, the Golden Rule actually tells us to 
give to others what they need. It is thus not a law of desire or evaluation, but a law of 
gift-love, a law of giving to others what they lack.
38
 
     For Luther, this Christian love emerges from the imitation of the love of God which 
'does not find, but creates that which is pleasing to it'.
39
 God is able to love even emptiness 
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      E.g. WA 32, 318,30-35; 370, 28-371, 25. 
36
 
      Cf. Westerholm's (Perspectives, 22-23) thesis 5 above. 
37
 
       See e.g. Luther's explanation of 'clean heart' (Matt. 5.8), WA 32, 325, 33-366, 8, and 
also WA 50, 643, 27-31. - Of course, this evokes many additional questions pertaining to the 
ethical theory at hand. Cf. e.g. Oswald Bayer, Martin Luthers Theologie, Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck 2003, e.g.110-139, 256-296 and Risto Saarinen, 'Ethics in Luther's Theology', in Jill 
Kraye - Risto Saarinen (eds.) Moral Philosophy on the Threshold of Modernity, Dordrecht: 
Springer 2005, 195-215. As Geyer, 'Bergpredigt', 293, points out, the new ethics does not 
remain only interior. 
38
 
      See Raunio, Summe, and, for a brief summary in English, Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, 'The 
Christian as Christ to the Neighbour: On Luther's Theology of Love', International Journal of 
Systematic Theology 6, 2004, 101-117. Even though Raunio and Kärkkäinen outline a 
heuristically fruitful interpretation, the dynamics of gift-love and need-love is extremely 
complicated both historically and systematically. For some other new interpretations, see e.g. 
Risto Saarinen, God and the Gift: An Ecumenical Theology of Giving, Collegeville: The 
Liturgical Press 2005, and Jean-Luc Marion, Le phénomène érotique, Paris: Grasset 2003. 
39
 
      So Luther's famous thesis 28 of the Heidelberg Disputation (1518), WA 1, 365, 2-3. 
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and the sinner - this is the capacity of agape to fulfill the imperfections and needs of the 
universe. When Christians try to live according to the Golden Rule, they should imitate this 
rule of divine love. Humans should meet their neighbour's needs, aiming to be Good 
Samaritans to them as Christ has been our Samaritan. This, however, would require an 
attitude which runs contrary to natural, egoistic, and desire-based human reasoning.
40
 
    Raunio points out that Luther outlines a true Christian practice of a Christian 
community.
41
 The rule of divine love is not a new law which would be at variance with the 
Mosaic law. But it is nevertheless something that is not instinctively found in the natural 
intuitions of all humans. A truly Christian neighbourly love, though in consonance with the 
Decalogue and perhaps even with the natural moral law, requires a theological model, a rule 
of divine love to be imitated. In this sense the Christian following of the Golden Rule is a 
fruit of faith and presupposes grace. It would probably be misleading to call this behavior a 
'work ethic', but we see that the relationship with God also qualifies the observance of the law 
in a new way. 
    Following Raunio, Reinhard Hütter remarks that the law's content can be 'restored to its 
original intent as the genuine expression of God's will: the law of love.' This law, received in 
Christ, is welcomed with delight, and, as Luther tells us, 'whenever there is this delight, it 
does what God commands. Then the law does not cause a guilty conscience, but causes joy, 
because one has become another person already'.
42
 Hütter's quote from Luther comes 
astonishingly close to the emphasis of the 'new perspective', claiming that the Pauline 
Christian can fulfill the law in Spirit, the person being already almost other person than the 
one described in Romans 7. The Christian alternative outlined here does not appear, however, 
as a radical alternative to Jewish law, but rather as its fulfilment or as its restoration to 
express the original will of God. 
    Many good Lutherans probably think that my presentation has twisted Luther's theology 
of the law. I have selected a number of features from the Reformer that run contrary to the 
traditional picture, as summarized by Westerholm. The positive meanings ascribed to the 
Christian observance to the law do not mean that sinners could be justified by works of law; 
this is not meant by the advocates of the 'new perspective' either. Although I have not told the 
whole story of both law and gospel in Lutheranism, I think that the evidence presented here 
has some weight. As in Paul, we find evidence in Luther for both the 'old' and 'new' 
perspectives, with regard to the issue of law. 
 
3.2. Do Christians Remain Permanently Unable to Fulfill the Law? 
 
In all their ecumenical dialogues, Lutherans have stressed that a Christian is and remains a 
sinner even when he or she is justified. There can be little doubt that both Martin Luther and 
the later Lutherans have always emphasized the being of a Christian as 'righteous and sinner 
at the same time' (simul iustus et peccator) and that Lutherans have been the most ardent 
Christians combatants against self-righteousness. 
    But there must be a theological limit to this emphasis. If we go beyond this limit, we 
would simply claim that Christianity would do no good for you, since you will always remain 
                                                          
40
 
      Cf. Raunio, Summe and Kärkkäinen, 'Love'. 
41
 
      For the communal and diaconal dimension of the church as communion, see e.g. Union 
with Christ, 116-120. 
42
 
      Hütter, Bound, 11, quoting Luther, WA 16, 285, 9. 
the same sinner. Most likely Lutherans do not claim this, but sometimes other churches think 
that Lutherans are in danger of emptying the grace of God in their claim of the permanent 
sinfulness of all Christians.
43
 
    At least in systematic theology, one is therefore bound to admit that the Christian faith 
has some bearing upon Christians, even though all people remain sinners and cannot fulfill 
the law by their own powers. In Luther research, scholars traditionally discuss whether Luther 
allows for any progress (profectio) in Christian life and whether Luther teaches the so-called 
'partial' meaning of simul iustus et peccator, according to which one would be 'to an extent' 
(partim) sinful and, to an extent, righteous.
44
 
    The new Finnish interpretation of Luther has argued that justification, as it becomes 
expressed in terms of participation with Christ, has an effective bearing upon the justified 
sinner. This interpretation, outlined in particular by Tuomo Mannermaa and Simo Peura, has 
met with criticism especially in Germany. But even positions critical to this view have often 
affirmed that there must be an ontological side in the theological understanding of 
justification.
45
 Moreover, the Finnish interpretation, although critical of many earlier 
paradigms, in fact continues the long trend which considers the 'being in Christ' language to 
be of special importance for Luther.
46
 
     Tuomo Mannermaa pays attention to Luther's Commentary on Galatians in which Christ 
is said to become the subject of the good works of the Christian. Through Christ present in 
the faith of the believer, the believer can become 'a new person' that brings forth good fruit. 
Faith thus first 'makes' the person, and this Christian person can do good works.
47
 Although 
this event remains hidden and occurs under the cross, and although it is nevertheless Christ 
who remains the only meritorious subject in this process, one can understand how faith in 
deed has an effective bearing upon the person in question. Interestingly, Luther's view of 
bringing forth a new person, an allusion to Matt. 7.17, also here displays a parallel with the 
soteriology of the 'new perspective' in which the new person fulfills the law. 
    In spite of this parallel, there certainly remain differences between Luther and the new 
perspective. Whereas Paul as a Christian is assumed by the exegetes to be able to fulfill the 
law in a quasi-Pelagian manner, Luther's reading of Galatians only affirms that a new tree can 
bring forth good fruits. The tree or the believer, however, is no autonomous subject but is 
empowered to do this because of the union with Christ. The good work remains an 'opus 
theologicum', a theological action or deed, whose meritorious subject is Christ, not the 
Christian.
48
 Luther wants to preserve the anti-Pelagian view of human powers, whereas the 
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      One example would be the discussion on remaining concupiscence in the context of the 
Lutheran - Roman Catholic text Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification. For a 
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historical Paul, as interpreted by the new perspective, is probably not restricted by such 
considerations. 
     For our theological re-evaluation of Luther, however, it is important to see that Luther 
has a positive view of the fulfilment of the law by Christians in their union with Christ. The 
so-called 'third use of the law' as well as the sanctifying role of God's moral commands were 
much discussed by the older research.
49
 I do not want to identify the bringing forth of good 
fruits with the third use of the law. Nor do I find the old distinction between law and 
'command' (Gebot) very helpful. Recent studies, in particular Andreas Wöhle, have attempted 
to describe this feature in Luther in new and fresh ways. Reinhard Hütter speaks boldly of 
'original unity of gospel and law'
50
 which, for Luther, existed in paradise.  
     For many Lutherans, such a unity would be a confusion between law and gospel. I think 
that Antti Raunio's above-mentioned insistence on the unity of the law already establishes a 
permanent place for the law. I can side, however, with David Yeago's observation, according 
to which Luther in his interpretation of Genesis 2 recognises a divine law that presupposes 
the presence of grace and not sin. This reveals, so Yeago and Hütter, the original and 
fundamental significance of the law which is 'to give concrete, historical form to the 'divine 
life' of the human creature deified by God'.
51
 
     In this sense there seems to be a 'fulfilment of the law' in committed Christian life as 
well. It is not a traditional 'third use',
52
 since the uses of the law presuppose a human subject. 
In this theological deed or action, Christ present in the faith, or the grace of God present in 
Adam, makes the believer a new person who 'brings forth' good works. In this 'bringing forth' 
the fundamental subject remains hidden, since we are dealing with a theological action that 
takes place in union with Christ. But we may, I think, nevertheless say that the goodness of 
the good work is related to the same moral standard, the law or the original will of God, 
which accuses humans of their sin and which is preached in the Sermon on the Mount. In this 
sense there is a unity of the law and a fulfilment of the one law, the moral standard of both 
Old and New Covenant. 
      Given this, we may say that the point of Lutheran axioms like 'theology of the cross' 
and 'righteous and sinner at the same time' is not to say that Christianity and faith would have 
no bearing upon human existence. Rather, these axioms emphasize that all renewal and all 
emerging righteousness remain hidden 'under the opposite': under weakness, suffering and 
imperfection. As far as the fulfilment of the law is concerned, the axioms are not meant to 
deny morality, but they are critical of the human ability for judging the progress of others and 
even of oneself. Therefore, even though the points 2. and 4. of Westerholm's summary are as 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
      Cf. Reijo Työrinoja, 'Opus theologicum. Luther and Medieval Theories of Action',  Neue 
Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 44, 2002, 119-153. WA 40/1,  
417, 23-26. As Työrinoja points out, the Christian might nevertheless keep his or her 
'subjecthood' in some other sense.  
49
 
      See Lohse, Theologie, 293-294. 
50
 
      Hütter, Bound, 140; Wöhle, Freude. 
51
 
      Hütter, Bound, 140, quoting David Yeago, 'Martin Luther on Grace, Law, and Moral 
Life', The Thomist 62, 1998, 177. 
52
      Lutheran theology traditionally distinguishes among three 'uses': 1. through the law external discipline 
may be maintained, 2. the law leads people to a recognition of their sins and 3. the law conducts the entire life of 
the reborn Christians. (The Book of Concord, The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, ed. R. Kolb 
and T. Wengert, Minneapolis: Fortress 2000, 502)Through the history of Lutheranism, the adequacy of the 'third 
use' has been controversial, since Christians are in some Pauline sense no more 'under the law'. 
such true, they do not sketch out the full picture of Luther's theology of law and good works. 
This observation may also have some bearing on theses 1 and 6. 
    Luther can employ the term 'law' in this positive sense, as 'love of law' (dilectio legis) in 
his exposition of many Old Testament texts.
53
 Also Luther's exposition of the Sermon on the 
Mount contains an interesting excursus dealing with the issue of 'doing good' as criterion for 
entering into the Kingdom and receiving the wages in heaven.
54
 Luther emphasizes that as 
Christians we are all equal. There are, however, external differences relating to the various 
gifts and callings of different Christians. Since the Sermon on the Mount speaks of the good 
works of those who are already forgiven and possess grace, one cannot say that the different 
fruits produced by different Christians would somehow merit this grace. All fruits, that is, 
good works, result from grace.
55
 
    The remuneration by the Father and other such promises, so often repeated in Matt 5-7, 
are meant to console Christians in their daily struggle for the good. With the help of such 
promises you may carry on in spite of all adversities and injustices.
56
 But although we speak 
of wages, finally God gives everything and in Christ we are all equally participants of grace. 
It is the case, however, that some work more and some suffer more than others. They may 
need more consolation and remuneration. Interestingly, Luther admits that among Christians 
there are differences in their talents and in their industriousness. He says that this may result 
in differences in their future 'luminosity' or 'brightness' (Klarheit, Herrlichkeit). This does not 
pertain to the fundamental equality or to the merits of obtaining grace. And in heaven 
everyone rejoices at the brightness and glory of others.
57
 
     Without stretching too much the interpretation of this passage we may say that Luther 
here struggles with the relative activity of different Christians in bringing forth the fruits of 
faith. He is very clear in his insistence on the fundamental equality of all humans and in the 
axiom that we cannot earn grace. At the same time he does not want to downplay the moral 
commitment of doing good, expressed so emphatically in the Sermon on the Mount. We must 
bear in mind that Matthew 5-7 is, for Luther, concerned with the life of the justified Christian 
who is already 'another person' in his or her unity with Christ. Therefore, doing good in this 
context does not mean earning grace, but it relates to the bringing forth of good fruit. These 
fruits are concerned with the observance of the law, but their motivational background is not 
the so-called 'third use of the law'. They are fruits which arise from different callings and 
talents, whereby referring to them serves the purpose of consolation, and the resulting 
differences in 'brightness' do not alter the fundamental equality of all in Christ. Thus we find 
in this text a similar view of 'divine life' and 'delight of law' as in the above-mentioned 
expositions of the Old Testament. 
  
3.3. Who Is Speaking in Romans 7? And What Does the Speaker Not Do? 
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Even in Luther's exposition of Romans 7 we may observe a curious pattern which offers 
counter-evidence to Westerholm's portrayal. First me must admit that the New Testament 
scholars are right in their basic point. It is evident that Luther, following Augustine, 
understands the 'I' to mean the apostle Paul as a spiritual person. This is emphatically stated in 
Lecture on Romans (1515/16) when Rom. 7.7 is exposed.
58
 We may note in passing that 
Luther repeatedly mentions the other alternative, the 'I' as a carnal person. But, when the 'I' in 
Rom. 7.14 claims to be carnal, Luther remarks that this claim only proves his point. For a 
spiritually wise man knows his own flesh and despises it, whereas a foolish carnal person 
would boast of his spirituality.
59
 We may note that these two alternatives correspond to 
models A. and C. in our Ch. 1 above. 
     In Rom. 7.17 the 'I' claims that it is not himself, but the 'sin in me' that is operative in the 
person. Luther tells that many, offended by this verse, interpret it to mean that the 'I' must be 
the carnal person. Since if the speaker were spiritual, he would have no sin. But this opinion 
of some real or imagined contemporaries of  Luther
60
 is false and harmful. In reality, the 
verse proves that even the spiritual person remains sinful.
61
 In terms of our earlier discussion, 
the alternatives B. and C. are thus ruled out. 
    This does not mean for Luther, however, that the speaker in question would perform a 
morally bad action. How come? Given that Romans 7 has been understood as a prooftext of 
permanent sinfulness, this is a surprising turn, a turn which has been neglected in the 
allegedly 'Lutheran' reception history of this text. Luther admits that a human reader of 
Romans 7 is inclined to draw the conclusion that Paul simply commits a 'morally and 
metaphysically' bad action. But this is not the case. As a holy and spiritual person the apostle 
Paul would like to perform a good action in a totally pure and free fashion, but because of the 
flesh he cannot perform it in this perfect way, but rather he does good only with some 
repugnance and aversion.
62
 After saying this, Luther starts to build a massive qualification 
around what we called, above, alternative A. 
    The sin of the apostle consists of the inner aversion. Expressions, like 'to will something 
other than what one does' in Romans 7, mean that the apostle as a spiritual person wills to 
perform his action with such perfection that no aversion remains in the subject. Because of 
the flesh, this does not happen. But the good action is performed with some remaining carnal 
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interpretation of 'moraliter et metaphysice', see Grane, Modus, 95. 
repugnance. Therefore the apostle does not do what he wants to do, but he does what he does 
not want.
63
 In other words, doing the external good with an intensity of, say, eighty percent, 
would still be an instance of 'non enim quod volo hoc ago' (not doing what I want to do, Rom. 
7.15), because the speaker wants to do good with an intensity of 100 percent, willing totally 
and without repugnance. And the remaining twenty percent, although a merely latent inner 
counter-movement, is counted as sin and is enough to qualify the externally good action as 
'quod nolo illud facio' (doing what I do not want to do, Rom. 7.16), and in this sense as sin. 
    This sounds like sophistry and it is evident that through this interpretation Luther wants to 
rescue Paul from saying that the apostle sins morally in his external action. But it is 
remarkable for our study that Luther in fact thinks, actually in keeping with his famous simul 
iustus et peccator, that the Apostle Paul in Romans 7 does pursue the good, although 
externally and with some inner aversion. The sin does not consist in a bad action, but in the 
fact that while he wills perfectly, he can actualize this will in his deed only imperfectly and in 
this qualified sense fails to do what he wants to do. Using scholastic terminology, Paul in 
Luther's interpretation does not display moral weakness (akrasia, incontinentia), but 
continence (enkrateia, continentia). In fact, Luther here continues the extensive medieval 
discussion on the so-called 'appetitus contrarii'.
64
 
    The same argument appears in a condensed fashion in two later writings, namely in 
Luther's Resolutiones written after the Leipzig disputation of 1519, and in the preparatory part 
of the Heidelberg Disputation of 1518. In Leipzig, Luther defended the view that nobody 
does good without sinning. In Resolutiones, this view is explained with the help of Romans 7. 
A hasty reader of this condensed text may wonder how on earth Paul's argument could be 
employed for such a purpose. But, if the text is read together with Luther's Lecture on 
Romans, the point becomes clear: even the most holy apostle must admit that all his actions 
are contaminated by the repugnant flesh and therefore he fails to achieve the perfect and 'full' 
implementation of the law which he wants to achieve. Therefore, nobody does good without 
sinning.
65
 
    In preparing the Heidelberg Disputation, Luther claims that the righteous person sins 
even 'between' his good works. This is proved with the help of Rom. 7.19 and 7.22. During 
all our life, Luther says, the good will and the resisting bad will struggle with one another. 
There is never a 'total' or whole will, but all will remains 'mixed' in this way.
66
 For this reason 
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there is always some sin present even in and between our good works. When Luther here 
claims that a person 'wills the good according to the Spirit, but does not do it, but does the 
contrary', he does not mean that the person would externally follow the worse option. The 
'contrary' mentioned here is 'some nill' (quaedam noluntas), which contaminates the good 
action so that it is not totally without sin.
67
 
     One should be careful not to read Luther so that the subject of Romans 7 would choose 
the wrong external option. The whole point of the two disputation texts is to claim that all, 
even the best, human actions remain sinful because the human being remains carnal. They are 
not claiming that the apostle Paul does not externally do what he wants to do. When the two 
texts are read together with the Lecture on Romans, the meaning becomes clear and supports 
Luther's point: even while doing good a Christian always sins. In fact, this is the well-known 
core of Luther's radicalization of simul iustus et peccator: the sin need not be manifest or 
external in order to be called sin. Already the repugnancy and the bad internal desire in itself 
is sinful. 
    This horizon is further presupposed in Luther's most exhaustive and most influential 
reading of Rom. 7.14-8.1 in his Against Latomus (1521). I will not go into the details of this 
very long interpretation
68
 but mention only that Luther here defends the view that the 
imperfections of the justified Christian must be called 'sin'. In Romans 7, the Christian apostle 
Paul wills the good and consents to the good, but because of his twofold, that is, carnal and 
spiritual, existence neither the good nor the bad will is whole. In this sense, the external deed 
remains 'contrary' to the perfect good, willed by the good will.
69
 This does not mean, 
however, that the flesh would overcome in action. The spirit dominates the action, but so that 
the flesh remains averted and repugnant and thus there is sin.
70
 Therefore, both the pious and 
the impious remain sinful in their thought in a similar way; Luther even says that the sinful 
attack is greater for the pious. But since the pious have the 'antidote' given by their being in 
grace and in Christ, they do not commit sin in the same manner as the impious.
71
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
      WA 1, 367, 2, 15-27 (see also next note). For 'voluntas tota' and 'mixta' in medieval 
tradition, cf. Saarinen, Weakness, 20-86 and Andrea Rubiglio, L'impossibile volere, Milano: 
Vita et pensiero 2002. 
67
 
      WA 1, 367, 18-21, 24-27: '... Simul vult bonum secundum spiritum, et tamen hoc non 
agit, sed contrarium. Hoc itaque contrarium quaedam est noluntas, quae semper est, quando est 
voluntas. Per hanc bene facit et per illam male facit. Nolle est ex carne et velle ex spiritu. ... 
Mixta enim sunt haec duo in omni vita et opere nostro. ... Ideo semper peccamus, dum 
benefacimus, licet quandoque minus, quandoque magis.' 
68
 
       See WA 8, 99-126. Luther's own detailled reading is given in 120, 31-125, 31 but it is 
useful to pay attention to the whole context of this reading. 
69
 
      WA 8,120,33-36: 'Mira compositio [Rom. 7.16]: consentit legi bonae, sed non totus, quia 
facit non totus, quod vult non totus, neque consentiens, neque faciens, neque nolens hic totus 
est, sed idem qui consentit bonae legi, facit quod non vult, id est, contrarium legi bonae, quam 
vult.' 
70
 
      WA 8, 122, 11-12, 17-18: 'Alterum enim hic dicit per alterum impediri, sic tamen, ut 
spiritus praevaleat et illi tribuatur, quod non operetur, non velit malum. ... Nunc cum spiritus 
queruletur et accuset carnem, patet, quod non caro dominetur, sed dominanti spiritui molesta et 
rebellis sit.' 
71
 
      WA 8, 123,9-12. 
    Leaving aside many other aspects pertaining to this interpretation of Romans 7, we can 
say that Luther, on the one hand, expresses the view of the 'Lutheran' Paul: Romans 7 speaks 
of Paul as an exemplary Christian. He exemplifies the continuing struggle with sin, thus being 
a paradigm of Christian as simul iustus et peccator. On the other hand, however, this does not 
entail the view that a Christian is characterised by weak will and permanent failure to do 
good. On the contrary, Paul as subject of Romans 7 is characterised by a strong will and by an 
external ability to do good. He misses the mark only in the sense that he wants to be perfect 
and, being carnal, cannot reach the absolute perfection. Thus our alternative A. becomes so 
strongly qualified that it begins to resemble the 'new perspective' offered by B. Both in Luther 
and in B. the Christian is said to fulfill the law. In both, this takes place in the Spirit. 
     Although Luther's exposition of Romans 7 remains at variance with the 'new perspective' 
insofar as it presupposes that the speaker is Paul the Apostle, we may thus identify interesting 
and even surprising parallels with the new perspective. Both positions presuppose a work 
ethic in which the Christian can fulfill the law to a significant extent. Of course grace and 
forgiveness remain necessary, since there always remains some sin. The fact that the holy 
apostle Paul remains carnal and sinful does not entail that he would not lead a moral life. He 
is in Christ and thus he can to a great extent bring forth the fruits of Christian existence. 
Luther's point is only that the apostle nevertheless continues to participate in the carnal 
existence which is characterised by aversion and some non-will which qualify as sin. Thus the 
two different exegetical strategies lead to surprisingly similar conclusions, namely that the 
apostle in his union with Christ, in his life in the Spirit, as a spiritual person, can cope with 
the same law, the will of God, in a new and successful manner. 
     
4. Conclusion 
 
Our study has yielded the following picture: New Testament scholars claim that, because of 
the Lutheran axiom 'righteous and sinner at the same time', they have been misguided in their 
reading of Paul for centuries. Only recently have they liberated their understanding from this 
axiom. Therefore they can now see that, after his conversion, Paul thinks that he can fulfill 
the law in the Spirit and in Christ. The exemplary I of Romans 7 refers to the pre-Christian 
existence, as it is described from a specific Christian viewpoint. This new result is an 
essential element of the so-called 'new perspective', achieved in the study of Paul during the 
last twenty-five years. 
    In our reading of Luther we have observed, however, that Luther also sometimes adopts a 
positive view of the law in the life of Christians. He thinks that the justified person in his or 
her union with Christ can perform 'theological actions' in which good results are brought forth 
spontaneously, like a good tree produces good fruit. In this theological action the person has 
been renewed. Through Christ present in the faith, the Christian is in the process of becoming 
'another person'. The new person fulfills the moral law, although he is not 'using' the law as an 
instrument of his own sanctification. Christ remains the only meritorious subject of the 
theological actions of the new person. Nevertheless the Christian individual now displays 
moral practises which are consonant with the idea of fulfilling the law. 
     Luther adheres to the basic unity of the law. Although Jesus purifies and clarifies the 
law, he teaches the same morals as the Old Testament, namely the original will of God 
concerning good and bad. In bringing forth good fruits the Christian is fulfilling the one 
moral law, although in a theological manner, that is, in the Spirit and in union with Christ. 
    Luther's interpretation of Romans 7 between 1515 and 1521 does not entail the view that 
the apostle Paul, or the paradigmatic Christian, would remain unable to produce good actions. 
The axiom 'righteous and sinner at the same time' only means that good actions are brought 
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forth in an imperfect manner and that the sin continues in this sense. Romans 7 is thus not a 
description of a weak-willed (akratic) Christian, but it is a description of a continent or 
strong-willed (enkratic) Christian. Although the internal will of the Christian may be perfectly 
good, the resulting actions remain, at least theologically speaking, less than perfect. So, the 
Christian in Romans 7 does not simply fail to do good, but in 'doing what he does not want to 
do' he fails to be perfect and fails to get totally free of the sin brought about by carnal 
existence. In that sense he sins even while doing good. On the other hand, he in fact does do 
good. 
   All this brings Luther's theology significantly closer to the 'new perspective' than many 
exegetes and Luther interpreters have assumed. Of course this need not mean anything with 
regard to the historical study of Paul. Heuristic categories like 'Lutheran Paul' and 'new 
perspective' continue to possess their heuristic value irrespective of their historical accuracy. 
Given our results, however, we ought to ask at least who actually initiated the so-called 
'Lutheran' reading of Romans 7. This question is left unanswered in the present study. My aim 
has been to show that, after the liberation of New Testament studies from Lutheranism, we 
may with some good reason initiate a counter-movement in which Lutheran theology aims at 
re-engaging the study of Paul. My proposal is that this re-engagement should not primarily 
consist of a criticism of the 'new perspective'. It may be more fruitful to show that Martin 
Luther's theology is closer to the insights of the new perspective than has been previously 
assumed. 
 
Abbreviations: 
 
WA = Martin Luthers Werke, Weimarer Ausgabe. Weimar: Böhlau 1883-. 
